Let's salute to our Indian Army together, We are proud to be Indian.


Our Indian Army was founded 124 years on 1st April,1895.The Indian Army also called in Hindi Bharatiya Thala Sena is the land-based branch and the largest component of the Indian Armed Forces. The President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Indian Army and it is commanded by the Chief of Army Officer who is a four-star general. Two officers have been honour with the rank of field marshal, a five-star rank, which is a dignified position of great honour. Origin of The Indian Army was from the East India Company, later known as the British Indian Army, and the armies of the princely states, which finally became the national army after independence.

Army crest
Indian army


The headquarter of Indian Army is in the capital of India, New Delhi.


“Service Before Self.”

Commander-Chief of Army:

Honourable President Shri. Ram Nath Kovind.

Chief of The Army Staff:

General Bipin Rawat (Honored with PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC)

Vice Chief of the Army Staff:

Lieutenant General Manoj Mukund Naravane, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM

Minister of Defense:

Honorable Mr.Rajnath Singh


1.4 millions

Indian Army HQ In India-

Headquarters, Indian ArmyNew Delhi
Central CommandLucknowLt General Iqroop Singh Ghuman
Eastern CommandKolkataLt General Anil Chauhan
Northern CommandUdhampurLt General Ranbir Singh
Southern CommandPuneLt General Satinder Kumar Saini
South Western CommandJaipurLt General Alok Singh Kler
Western CommandChandimandirLt General Surinder Singh
Army Training CommandShimlaLt General Pattacheruvanda C. Thimayya

Battles Fought By Indian Army –

First Kashmir War (1947):

Following autonomy, pressures among India and Pakistan started to bubble over, and the first of three full-scale wars between the two countries broke out over the then august territory of Kashmir. The Maharaja of Kashmir needed to have a halt position. Since Kashmir was a Muslim lion’s share state, Pakistan needed to make Kashmir a Pakistani region. Therefore, Pakistan attacked Kashmir on 22nd October 1947, causing Maharaja Hari Singh to look to India, explicitly to Lord Mountbatten of Burma, the representative general, for assistance. He marked the Instrument of Accession to India on 26th October 1947. Indian soldiers were transported to Srinagar from 27th October first light onwards.This unexpected included General Thimayya who separated himself in the activity and in the years that pursued turned into a Chief of the Indian Army. An extraordinary war was pursued over the state and previous confidants ended up battling one another. Pakistan endured noteworthy misfortunes. Its powers were halted hanging in the balance shaped which is currently called LOC . An uneasy UN supported harmony returned before the finish of 1948 with Indian and Pakistani warriors confronting each other legitimately hanging in the balance of Control, which has since partitioned Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistan-held Kashmir. Various UN goals were passed requiring a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir to decide promotion to India or Pakistan simply after Pakistan pulled back its military from Kashmir. A precondition to the goals was for Pakistan and India to come back to a condition of “as seemed to be” before the contention. Pakistan would pull back all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals acquired to battle in Kashmir. With Pakistan declining to draw back there could be no further discourse on satisfying the UN goals. Pressures among India and Pakistan, to a great extent over Kashmir, have never been totally wiped out.

Operation Polo (1948):

After the segment of India, the State of Hyderabad, an august state under the standard of a Nizam, stayed free. The Nizam, wouldn’t consent his state to the Union of India. The accompanying showdown between the Government of India and the Nizam finished on 12th September, 1948 when India’s then delegate Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel requested Indian soldiers to verify the state. During five days of battling, the Indian Army, upheld by an Indian Air Force squadron of Hawker Tempest flying machine, steered the Hyderabad State powers. Five Indian Army infantry forces and one protected squadron were occupied with the activity. The next day, the State of Hyderabad was announced as a piece of the Union of India. Significant General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri, who drove the Operation Polo and acknowledged the give up of the Nizam’s powers on 18 September 1948, was designated the military legislative head of Hyderabad (1948–1949) to reestablish lawfulness.

Korean War (1950-1953)

During the Korean War, India sent the 60th Indian Field Ambulance unit to aid the UN troops fighting against the Chinese and North Korean invasion of South Korea, though they decided against sending combat forces. The 60th PFA was included in the 1st Commonwealth Division. In the aftermath of the war, an Indian infantry brigade formed the Custodian Force of India as some of the soldiers were also sent to Korea as part of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee to assist in the exchange of prisoners of war. The NNRC was commanded by Lt Gen KS Thimayya.

Annexation of Goa (1961):

Despite the fact that the British and French cleared all their pilgrim assets in the Indian subcontinent, Portugal would not surrender control of its Indian states of Goa, Daman and Diu. After rehashed endeavors by India to consult with Portugal for the region were spurned by Portuguese head administrator and tyrant, António de Oliveira Salazar, India propelled Operation Vijay on 12th December, 1961 to take Goa from the Portuguese. A little unforeseen of its soldiers entered Goa, Daman, and Diu to catch and verify the domain. After a short clash, where 31 Portuguese fighters were killed, the Portuguese Navy frigate NRP Afonso de Albuquerque crushed, and more than 3,000 Portuguese caught, Portuguese General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva gave up to Maj Gen KP Candeth (Kunhiraman Palat Kandoth) of the Indian Army, following twenty-six hours. Goa, Daman and Diu turned into a piece of the Republic of India.

Sino-Indian War (1962):

The reason for this war was a disagreement regarding the sway of the broadly isolated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh fringe areas. Aksai Chin, guaranteed by India to have a place with Kashmir, and by China to be a piece of Xinjiang, contains a significant street interface that associates the Chinese districts of Tibet and Xinjiang. China’s development of this street was one of the triggers of the contention.

Little scale conflicts among Indian and Chinese powers broke out as India demanded the contested McMahon Line being viewed as the global fringe between the two nations. Chinese soldiers guaranteed not to have fought back to the cross-outskirt terminating by Indian soldiers, in spite of supporting misfortunes. China’s doubt of India’s contribution in Tibet made more breaks between the two nations.

In 1962, the Indian Army was requested to move to the Thag La edge situated close to the fringe among Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh and around 5 km north of the contested McMahon Line. In the meantime, Chinese soldiers had additionally made attacks into Indian-held region, and strains between the two arrived at another high when Indian powers found a street built by China in Aksai Chin. After a progression of bombed exchanges, the People’s Liberation Army assaulted Indian Army positions at the Thag La edge. This move by China got India off guard by twelfth October, Nehru gave orders for the Chinese to be removed from Aksai Chin. In any case, poor co-appointment among different divisions of the Indian Army, and the late choice to assemble the Indian Air Force in immense numbers, gave China a significant strategic and vital bit of leeway over India. On twentieth October, Chinese troopers assaulted India in both the North-West and North-Eastern pieces of the outskirt and caught huge parts of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

As the battling moved past contested domains, China approached the Indian government to arrange, anyway India stayed resolved to recover a lost area. With not a single tranquil consent to be seen, China singularly pulled back its powers from Arunachal Pradesh. The explanations behind the withdrawal are questioned with India guaranteeing different strategic issues for China and conciliatory help from the United States, while China expressed that despite everything it held region it had staked political case over. The separating line between the Indian and Chinese powers was named the Line of Actual Control.

The poor choices made by India’s military officers and, its political initiative, brought up a few issues. The Henderson-Brooks and Bhagat board of trustees was before long set up by the Government of India to decide the reasons for the horrible showing of the Indian Army. Its report censured the choice not to permit the Indian Air Force to target Chinese vehicle lines out of dread of a Chinese flying counter-assault on Indian nonmilitary personnel zones. A significant part of the fault was likewise focused at the ineptitude of then-Defense Minister, Krishna Menon who left his post not long after the war finished. Notwithstanding incessant requires its discharge, the Henderson-Brooks report still stays ordered. Neville Maxwell has composed a record of the war.

Indo-Pakistan War (1965):

A second encounter with Pakistan occurred in 1965. In spite of the fact that the war is depicted as uncertain, India had the better of the war and was a reasonable champ in strategic and key terms. Pakistani President Ayub Khan propelled Operation Gibraltar in August 1965, during which a few Pakistani paramilitary soldiers penetrated into Indian-managed Kashmir and endeavor to touch off an enemies of India tumult in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani pioneers accepted that India, which was all the while recouping from the deplorable Sino-Indian War, would be not able arrangement with a military push and a Kashmiri resistance. India responded quickly and propelled a counter hostile on Pakistan. Pakistan propelled Operation Grand Slam in answer on 1 September, attacking India’s Chamb-Jaurian part. In reprisal, the Indian Army propelled a significant hostile all through its outskirt with Pakistan, with Lahore as its practical objective.

Indian Army official beside an annihilated Pakistani Sherman tank, after the skirmish of Asal Uttar.

At first, the Indian Army met with significant achievement in the northern segment. In the wake of propelling delayed ordnance floods against Pakistan, India had the option to catch three significant mountain positions in Kashmir. By 9 September, the Indian Army had made extensive in-streets into Pakistan. India had its biggest take of Pakistani tanks when the hostile of Pakistan’s first Armored Division was blunted at the Battle of Asal Uttar, which occurred on 10 September close Khemkaran.The greatest tank clash of the war came as the Battle of Chawinda, the biggest tank fight in history after World War II. Pakistan’s destruction at the Battle of Asal Uttar rushed the finish of the contention.

At the hour of truce presentation, per unbiased sources, India detailed setbacks of around 3,000. Then again, it was assessed that in excess of 3,800 Pakistani warriors were slaughtered in the fight. Around 200-300 Pakistani tanks were either decimated or caught by India. India lost a sum of 150-190 tanks during the conflict.The choice to come back to pre-war positions, following the Tashkent Declaration, caused an objection among the polity in New Delhi. It was broadly accepted that India’s choice to acknowledge the truce was because of political variables, and not military, since it was confronting impressive weight from the United States and the UN to stop threats.

Sino-India Conflict (1967):

The 1967 Sino-Indian skirmish, also known as the Cho La incident, was a military conflict between Indian troops and members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army who had infiltrated on 1st October 1967 in Sikkim, then a protectorate of India. On 10th October, both sides clashed again. Defence Minister Sardar Swaran Singh assured the Indian people that the government was taking care of developments along the border. In the aftermath of the conflict Indian losses were 88 killed, and 163 wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathula, and 40 in Chola. The Chinese Army left Sikkim after being defeated by Indian troops.

Operation Steeplechase (1971):

Under the supervision of Indira Gandhi during the president’s standard in 1971, the Indian Army and the Indian police propelled Operation Steeplechase, an enormous “counter-insurrection” activity against the Naxalites, which brought about the passing of several Naxalites and the detainment of in excess of 20,000 suspects and frameworks including senior pioneers. The military was additionally helped by a unit of para commandos and the Indian paramilitary. The activity was composed in October 1969, and Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob was charged by Govind Narain, the home secretary of India, that “there ought to be no exposure and no records” and Jacob’s solicitation to be given composed requests was additionally renounced by Sam Manekshaw.

Bangladesh Liberation (1971):

A freedom development broke out in East Pakistan which was squashed by Pakistani powers. Because of huge scale monstrosities against them, a large number of Bengalis took shelter in neighboring India causing a significant outcast emergency there. In mid 1971, India announced its full-support for the Bengali agitators, known as Mukti Bahini, and Indian operators were widely associated with incognito activities to help them.

On 20th November 1971, the Indian Army moved the 14 Punjab Battalion 45 Cavalry into Garibpur, a deliberately significant town close to India’s fringe with East Pakistan, and effectively caught it. The next day, more conflicts occurred among Indian and Pakistani powers. Careful about India’s developing inclusion in the Bengali resistance, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) propelled a preemptive strike on 10 Indian air bases at: Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Agra, Adampur, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Uttarlai and Sirsa at 17:45 hours on 3rd December. In any case, this airborne hostile neglected to achieve its expressed targets, and gave India a reason to pronounce a full-scale war against Pakistan that day. By 12 PM, the Indian Army, joined by the Indian Air Force, propelled a significant three-pronged ambush into East Pakistan. The Indian Army won a few fights on the eastern front including the unequivocal clash of Hilli, which was the main front where the Pakistani Army had the option to develop significant obstruction. The activity likewise incorporated a force level airborne activity on Tangail, which brought about the capitulation of all obstruction inside five days. India’s enormous early gains were ascribed to a great extent to the speed and adaptability with which Indian defensively covered divisions moved crosswise over East Pakistan.

Pakistan propelled a counter-assault against India on the western front. On 4th December 1971, the An organization of the 23rd Battalion of India’s Punjab Regiment identified and caught the development of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani Army close Ramgarh, Rajasthan. The skirmish of Longewala followed during which the An organization, however being dwarfed, defeated the Pakistani development until the Indian Air Force guided its contenders to draw in the Pakistani tanks. When the fight had finished, 38 Pakistani tanks and 100 heavily clad vehicles were either devastated or relinquished. Around 200 Pakistani soldiers were murdered in real life during the fight while two Indian warriors lost their lives. Pakistan endured another significant thrashing on the western front during the skirmish of Basantar which was battled from 4th December to the sixteenth. Before the finish of the fight, around 66 Pakistani tanks were pulverized and 40 more were caught. Consequently, Pakistani powers had the option to pulverize just 11 Indian tanks. None of the numerous Pakistani offensives on the western front emerged. By 16 December, Pakistan had lost sizeable domain on both the eastern and western fronts.

Under the order of Lt. General J.S. Arora, the three corps of the Indian Army, which had attacked East Pakistan, entered Dhaka and constrained Pakistani powers to give up on 16 December 1971, one day after the finish of the skirmish of Basantar. After Pakistan’s Lt General An A K Niazi marked the Instrument of Surrender, India took in excess of 90,000 Pakistani detainees of war. When of the marking, 11,000 Pakistani warriors were murdered in real life while India endured 3,500 fight related passings. Likewise, Pakistan lost 220 tanks during the fight contrasted with India’s 69.

In 1972, the Simla Agreement was marked between the two nations and strains stewed. Notwithstanding, there were infrequent spurts in conciliatory strains which finished in expanded military watchfulness on the two sides.

Siachen Conflict (1984):

The Siachen Glacier, however a piece of the Kashmir district, was not formally delineated on maps arranged and traded between the different sides in 1947. As an outcome, preceding the 1980s, neither India nor Pakistan kept up any changeless military nearness in the locale. Be that as it may, Pakistan started directing and enabling a progression of mountaineering campaigns to the ice sheet starting during the 1950s. By the mid 1980s, the Government of Pakistan was allowing uncommon endeavor grants to mountain dwellers and United States Army maps intentionally demonstrated Siachen as a piece of Pakistan. This training offered ascend to the contemporary importance of the term oropolitics.

India, conceivably chafed by these advancements, propelled Operation Meghdoot in April 1984. A whole unit of the Kumaon Regiment was carried to the icy mass. Pakistani powers reacted rapidly and conflicts between the two pursued. The Indian Army verified the vital Sia La and Bilafond La mountain passes, and by 1985 more than 2,600 km2 of domain ‘guaranteed’ by Pakistan was under Indian control. The Indian Army keeps on controlling all the Siachen Glacier and its tributary icy masses. Pakistan made a few ineffective endeavors to recapture power over Siachen. In late 1987, Pakistan assembled around 8,000 soldiers and garrisoned them close Khapalu, intending to catch Bilafond La. In any case, they were shocked by Indian Army faculty guarding Bilafond. During the fight, around 23 Indian officers lost their lives, while in excess of 150 Pakistani soldiers died. Further ineffective endeavors to recover positions were propelled by Pakistan in 1990, 1995, 1996 and 1999, most prominently in Kargil that year.

India keeps on keeping up a solid military nearness in the district, in spite of amazingly cold conditions. The contention over Siachen is consistently refered to for instance of mountain fighting. The most elevated top in the Siachen icy mass locale, Saltoro Kangri, could be seen as deliberately significant for India in light of its gigantic height which could empower the Indian powers to screen a few Pakistani or Chinese developments in the prompt region. Keeping up command over Siachen represents a few strategic difficulties for the Indian Army. A few foundation ventures were built in the district, including a helipad at 6,400 m over the ocean level. In 2004, the Indian Army was spending an expected 2 million US $ per month to help its faculty positioned in the locale.

Counter-insurrection exercises:

The Indian Army has assumed a critical job previously, battling guerillas and fear mongers inside the country. The military propelled Operation Blue Star and Operation Woodrose during the 1980s to battle Sikh agitators. The military, alongside some paramilitary powers, has the prime duty of keeping up peace in the disturbed Jammu and Kashmir district, drove explicitly by the Northern Command. The Indian Army additionally sent an unexpected to Sri Lanka in 1987 as a piece of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The Indian Army additionally effectively directed Operation Golden Bird in 1995 for counter-rebellion in upper east India.

Kargil War – Operation Vijay (1999):

In 1998, India did atomic tests and a couple of days after the fact, Pakistan reacted with progressively atomic tests giving the two nations atomic prevention ability, despite the fact that India had tried one nuclear bomb which Pakistan needed. Strategic pressures facilitated after the Lahore Summit was held in 1999. Nonetheless, the feeling of confidence was brief since in mid-1999 Pakistani paramilitary powers and Kashmiri agitators caught the abandoned, however vital, Himalayan statures in the Kargil region of India. These had been cleared by the Indian armed force during the beginning of the unfriendly winter and should be reoccupied in spring. The ordinary Pakistani soldiers who assumed responsibility for these territories got significant help, both as arms and supplies, from Pakistan. A portion of the statures under their influence, which additionally incorporated the Tiger Hill, ignored the indispensable Srinagar-Leh Highway (NH 1A), Batalik and Dras.

Kargil War Memorial taking a gander at National Highway 1 from the foot of Tololing

When the size of the Pakistani attack was understood, the Indian Army immediately prepared around 200,000 soldiers and Operation Vijay was propelled. In any case, since the statures were under Pakistani control, India was at an unmistakable vital disservice. From their perception posts, the Pakistani powers had a reasonable viewable pathway to set down backhanded gunnery discharge on NH 1A, causing substantial setbacks on the Indians. This was a major issue for the Indian Army as the thruway was its primary strategic and supply course. Therefore, the Indian Army’s first need was to recover tops that were in the prompt region of NH 1A. This brought about Indian soldiers initially focusing on the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras. This was before long pursued by more assaults on the Batalik-Turtok sub-division which gave access to Siachen Glacier. Point 4590, which had the closest perspective on the NH 1A, was effectively recovered by Indian powers on 14th June.

Kargil War Memorial, worked to respect fallen warriors.

In spite of the fact that a large portion of the posts in the region of the roadway were cleared by mid-June, a few pieces of it close Dras saw sporadic shelling until the finish of the war. When the NH 1A territory was cleared, the Indian Army went to driving the attacking power back over the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among different attacks, gradually tilted the battle in support of India. All things considered, a few posts set up a firm opposition, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell just later in the war. As the activity was completely under way, around 250 ordnance firearms were gotten to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the observable pathway. At numerous essential focuses, neither big guns nor air power could oust the stations kept an eye on by the Pakistan troopers, who were out of unmistakable range. The Indian Army mounted some immediate frontal ground attacks which were moderate and caused significant damage given the precarious rising that must be made on tops as high as feet 5,500 m. Two months into the contention, Indian soldiers had gradually retaken the greater part of the edges they had lost; as indicated by authentic check, an expected 75%–80% of the barged in zone, and almost all high ground, was back under Indian control.

Following the Washington accord on 4 July, where Sharif consented to pull back Pakistani soldiers, the vast majority of the battling went to a continuous stop, yet a few Pakistani powers stayed in situations on the Indian side of the LOC. What’s more, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for every single fanatic gathering) dismissed Pakistan’s arrangement for a move down, rather choosing to battle on. The Indian Army propelled its last assaults in the most recent seven day stretch of July; when the Dras sub-division had been cleared of Pakistani powers, the battling stopped on 26th July. The day has since been set apart as Kargil Vijay Diwas in India. Before the finish of the war, India had continued control of all the region south and east of the Line of Control, as was set up in July 1972 for each the Shimla Accord. When all threats had finished, the quantity of Indian fighters executed during the contention remained at 527, while in excess of 700 ordinary individuals from the Pakistani Army were murdered. The quantity of Islamist warriors, otherwise called Mujahideen, murdered by Indian Armed Forces during the contention remained at around 3,000.